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Corporate Governance and Management Control Systems are two research fields that are 
concerned to a certain degree with the same problems. Yet the literature in both fields takes 
rarely notice of each other and the relationship between them. In this paper we argue that 
Corporate Governance is supported by Management Control Systems. In order to understand 
their relationship we take a historical perspective. We compare the evolution of Management 
Control in Germany and France and relate it to the North American concept. We also stress 
the concept of community that influenced historically in Germany and France both Corporate 
Governance and Management Control. Finally, we look into the professionalisation of the 
management control function. As a conclusion, we propose further research into the path 
dependency of the interrelationsip between Corporate Governance and Management Control 
Systems. 
 
I. Introduction   
 
Corporate Governance and Management Control Systems (MCS) are two research fields that 
are concerned to a certain degree with the same problems. For example, the DuPont system of 
financial control is widely regarded as a prototype of MCS. It served performance 
measurement and decision making for divisions and subsidiaries, i.e., remote control of them. 
Management Control is often concerned with responsibility centers. Corporate Governance is 
also concerned with the control of subsidiaries. Yet the literature in both fields takes rarely 
notice of each other and the relationship between Corporate Governance and MCS. The 2 
management control literature startet together with the management theorists (Taylor, Church, 
Fayol and others) at the beginning of the 19.th century. They saw control as an important 
function of management. Management science itself developed with the large corporations. 
However, control was mainly the management control of activities, cash flows, people, 
organisational units and managers itself.
1 The Corporate Governance literature is rather a 
child of the last decades. At least it took a remarkable upswing with the last accounting 
scandals and the resulting Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. However, a deeper understanding of 
both Corporate Governance and MCS is missing. This mutual understanding depends on a 
clear definition of both fields.  
 
Gourevitch and; Shinn (2005, 1, 3) say that Corporate Governance “…is the structure of 
power within each firm that determines who allocates money…- the authority structure of a 
firm-…”. It is shaped politically by law, in the U.S. from the Sherman Antitrust Act 1890 up 
to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. On page 5 this authors describe that authority structure as 
supervision of managers by shareholders. There are other definitions. Sometimes even the 
word “shareholder” is not used. For example, two German authors describe Corporate 
Governance as “a more-or-less country-specific framework of legal, institutional and cultural 
factors shaping the patterns of influence that stakeholders exert on managerial decision 
making” (Weimer, J.;Pape, J., 1999, 152). This framework consists of eight elements: The 
prevailing concept of the firm, board system, salient stakeholders able to exert influence on 
managerial decision-making, the importance of stock markets in the national economy, the 
presence or absence of an external market for corporate control, ownership structure, the 
extent to which executive compensation is dependent on corporate performance and, finally, 
the time horizon of economic relationships. 
 
We do not wish to contribute to a final definition of Corporate Governance. We understand its 
essence here as a system of supervision of top managers by shareholders. It is shaped by law 
and other social norms. Sometimes, as in Germany, stakeholders can participate to a minor 
degree in the supervision. With this understanding Management Control is primarily 
concerned with the internal control of managers by managers and the management control of 
activities, production and cash flows within a corporation or another organisation. In this 
                                                           
1 For a short historical outline, see Bouquin (1994 and 2005) and Schwarz (2002). 3 
paper we argue that Corporate Governance is supported by MCS. Improvement of the second 
contributes to the improvement of the first. In order to improve both we need a deeper 
understanding of both. However, our focus will be here on MCS. Different authors as well as 
different countries seem to have a different understanding. We will therefore compare the 
evolution of this concept in Germany and France and relate it to the North American concept. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. We begin with the evolution of the North American 
concept of Management Control. Two functions prevail in this concept: the support of 
corporate governance and the information of the managers about the business processes. The 
next two sections describe their evolution in France and Germany. In the third section, we 
argue that MCS are instruments of corporate governance. We also provide some historical 
insights into the ways in which the concept of community influenced both Corporate 
Governance and Management Control in Germany and France. Then we deal with 
Management Control as a representation for the managers. Finally, we look into the 
professionalisation or institutionalisation of the management control function. As a 
conclusion, we propose further research into the path dependency of the interrelationsip 




II. The North American concept of Management Control 
 
MCS is an evolutive concept, an ambiguous one too, because its mission, as will be shown, is 
to cope with a kind of ambiguity embedded in any situation involving managers. However, 
Management Control is not a culture free concept and practice. There are important reasons 
for that situation.  
 
The first reason comes from the fact, recently rediscovered, that MCS, as key devices of the 
internal control of organizations, support governance systems or can even be regarded as parts 
of them. Those systems, in spite of their new tendency to globalization, have been much more 
specific. The French case and the German one are typical examples. 
 4 
The second reason takes its source in the fact that the management control process is built on 
a north-american reference grounded on strong hypotheses about the representation of the 
firm, motivations of employees and managers’role. It is clear that such hypotheses cannot be 
considered culture free. 
 
Moereover, one should be clear about the meaning of Management Control. It is striking to 
note that the majority of authors dealing with the subject feel themselves obliged to define 
“control”. The great classic authors from Fayol to Urwick and M.-P. Follett have devoted 
chapters to the matter. The term is ambiguous: to check or to control? To control or to be 
controlled ? It is often suggested that the French and the Germans see the checking behind 
control, while the Anglo-Saxons see steering there
2. Such debates are not over, even in the 
North American world. R. Simon from Harvard University proposed 1995 a very broad vision 
of control and K. Merchant (1982) revised the classic Anthony’s typology distinguishing, 
within control, strategic planning, management control and tasks control. Other typologies 
exists and they are numerous (Chiapello, 1996) but, and this point will be discussed beyond, 
all of them are focusing on the way of controlling.  
 
If the word “control” is ambiguous, should we give it up? The answer is straightforward: 
some authors (Reeves and Woodward, 1970, for instance) note that the word «control» is 
largely used instead of “command” or “coordination”. There is a tendency to use «to control» 
(it is the case with Anthony and Day, 1952 and Anthony, 1965) to cover a good part of Fayols 
management process (Prévoir, Organiser, Commander, Coordonner, Contrôler - meaning to 
forecast, to organize to command, to coordinate and to control – in fact to check) or of 
Gulick’s (1937) POSDCORB (Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, 
Organizing, Reporting, Budgeting). There is no surprise in such a fact. To control is not to 
command because the link with the subordinate is remote. This last idea is straightforward.  
 
                                                           
2   Fayol is to be quoted here: “control consists in verifying that all occurs in accordance with the adopted 
program, the received orders and the allowed principles” (Fayol, 1916, 133). This is different from Robinson 
(1925, 147) : “Control is that fundamental of organization which comprises the means of providing the manager 
and the executives of an organization with continuous, prompt, and accurate information concerning the 
efficiency of operation, what the business is doing what it has done in the past and what it can be expected to do 
in the future. […] Control involves three principal elements: forecasting of results, recording of results, and 
placement of responsability for results.” 5 
Control is mainly remote command. There is no need to abandon the concept of control 
because of its ambiguity - this ambiguity is one of its advantages. Ambiguity is the essence of 
the modern organization, with all the psychological and sociological dimensions that can be 
attached to it. 
 
Why Control, for what use? Is the question perhaps useless? In any case, nobody asks it. The 
answer given by Anthony (1965) is taken for granted: “To achieve goal congruence in an 
organization”. However, such a vision may be applied to most organizational tools, and not 
only to MCS. Control has typologies, concepts (Otley and Berry, 1980), but no common 
agreed conceptual framework.  
 
For the remainder, some remarks by Anthony can clarify the issue. The organizations must set 
up systems of control that support the processes of control. Those are, according to Anthony, 
more general than the systems and with them, his typology deals. The contingency of the 
systems of control is on one hand due to specificities of managers, on the other hand to 
multiple variables known as factors of contingency in organizations theory (size, complexity, 
foreseeability and trend of the activity, technology, institutional constraints, etc).  
 
Conversely, one is allowed to take some distances with the basics of Anthony’s conceptual 
framework, which is a rather specific hierarchical vision of management: operational control 
deals with elementary tasks, activities that do not belong to management, because 
management, in Anthony’s framework, consists in ensuring the responsibility for activities 
and entities, not to enter into the details of the tasks. It is by the instruments of “management 
control” that managers control these "macro-tasks". Such a concept is an implicit impression 
of a well-conceived organization, but it is not really a viable paradigm because the border 
between task and activity is not clear. It is interesting to have in mind that Activity Based 
Costing (ABC) trying to define with the same „paradigm“ the notion of “activity” experienced 
the same difficulty. ABC and ABM never came to a clear definition what an activity is.  
 
The Anglo-Saxon framework is rather clearly made up today, in the sense that the MCS of the 
large companies, from now on, have as a starting point general standards, which take their 6 
sources in the managerial innovations of Dupont and General Motors in the 20s. An enormous 
piece of literature is available about it.
3 
 
This framework builds of Management Control on a set of tools based on information 
systems, which have at its origin mainly the accounting information system. It makes it 
possible to remote management and decentralization, thanks to a system of delegated 
objectives and means. It is based on the business model and the strategy of the company. It 
addresses managers because it entrusts them with the responsibility for situations in which the 
link between the aim and the resources to be mobilized is complex and depends on expertise 
more than on programming. 
 
This model has two principal functions that influence the tools it needs. The first function of 
Management Control is to support corporate governance. If one summarizes the idea of 
corporate governance like R. Perez (2003) by considering it as the "management of 
management”, it is clear that this expression applies to the modern vision of management 
control. This one, in its North-American version, tends to perpetuate in-house the modes of 
relationship, which connect the agents (executive) and their principals (shareholders).  
 
The second function of MCS is to provide the managers with data to induce them to act in the 
direction of the strategy. MCS describe and modelize the company processes. These two 
functions have direct consequences for management tools. 
 
 
                                                           
3   Chandler (1962); Sloan (1963); Chandler and Salsbury (1971); Kuhn (1986). 7 
III.   Some remarks on MCS as instruments of corporate 
governance and on historical influences in Germany and France 
 
MCS are instruments of corporate governance. They allow for decentralization in a diversified 
company, which is forced to distribute the work of management between the center and the 
periphery. What must be done by the “center”, what must be done by middle management? 
The Sloan’s principles at GM mainly treated this specific question. Years later, the Ashridge 
Group is still working on it with its worldwide comparative analyses.
4 Williamson (1970) did 
see in the case of General Motors and Dupont a sort of internal capital market thanks to the 
use of the ROI, the supposed model of an effective organization, where the leaders work out 
the strategy and impose it then to the intermediate managers. However, it has been shown 
recently that Sloan hid, behind a conventional description, which was made to comply with 
the attitude of Pierre Du Pont, the shareholder, a more complex reality in which the heads of 
divisions got profit from strategic latitude much stronger than that one believed to see 
(Freeland, 1996, 2001, 2002). 
 
In this function, Management Control rests on  
- The definition of centers of responsibility as independent as possible ones from anothers 
(ideally in theory centers of profit),  
- The choice of measurable targets, 
- The definition of the necessary resources,  
- The ex post measurement of results,  
- The omnipresence of the information systems.  
 
The exchanges between centers of responsibility are generally traced by internal charges and 
transfer prices. These principles lead to a structure organized around business units in a 
diversified company, and this structure is perfectly adapted to a segmental reporting as in the 
international accounting standards (FASB and IASC-IFRS) demanded. Management Control 
supports corporate governance. 
 
                                                           
4   Goold and Campbell (1987); Goold and Quinn (1990); Goold, Campbell and Alexander (1994). 8 
The wave of value creation measures had a direct impact on management control, which had 
lost of sight the importance of the cost of capital and of its management. The concept of 
"stakeholders" and of sustainable growth undoubtedly will also influence the systems of 
management control. In the future, the recognition of fair value in financial accounting and 
the key role given to intangibles assets in corporate value will influence MCS and their 
accounting tools. The Sarbanes Oxley Act and the laws taken in Europe upset MCS, not only 
by the introduction of new metrics but by making of it a key element of the internal control, in 
charge of bringing the guarantee that policies decided on by the shareholders are applied up to 
the bottom of the operational line.  
 
Many authors have shown that the dominant conception of control is North American and that 
it describes the way of conceiving the organization, which any North-American will consider 
normal. It is interesting that Sloan did take for granted that the system set up by the 
constitution of the United States of America could be transposed as system of management 
for General Motors. P. d’Iribarne, after G. Hofstede, showed that the processes are not 
neutral, that they comprise more or less valuable roles according to values in which one 
believes. Hofstede (1980) concluded in a famous and discussed study that some "factors" (in 
the sense given to this word in statistics) describe what one calls the national culture: the 
acceptance of the risk, the hierarchical distance, masculinity or femininity and so on.  
 
One cannot miss noticing that the Germans like the French are attached to traditions rather 
different from the North-American one. The German tradition goes back to the guilds that 
became elated during the Age of Romanticism. In the beginning of the 19
th century, the 
Austrian economist Müller opposed Adam Smith. Instead of Smith’ doctrine about the 
“interet de tous” he demanded a doctrine about the “interet generale”.
5 This opposition against 
laissez faire favoured a strong control by associations and the state and it is common to 
important economists. It continued from List over the socialists and communists
6, the historic 
school and the influential association for social policy up to Rathenau and Sombart. Finally, it 
culminated in the economic system of the fascists. List wrote: “I barefaced claim: Every 
industry within the state which is not controlled by the state is the beginning of the fall of the 
                                                           
5   A detailed investigation can be found in Barkai (1988, 68-102). 
6   According to the Communist Manifesto, an association will replace the bourgeois society. Association is the 
common goal – with or without private property is the differentia specifica. 9 
state.”
7 On the macro-level, the national economy was seen not as an abstraction but as a 
living organism.
8 For Roscher (1880, 88), one of the founders of the historical school that 
influenced over several decades the public opinion, the state was the most important 
immaterial capital (intangible asset) among others like customer base, know-how and trust. 
 
Practical relevance and economical success got the idea of associations and planning during 
World War I with the work of von Moellendorf and Rathenau
9 who organized the industrial 
production during these years. Rathenau (1921) wrote after the war a book under the title “Die 
neue Wirtschaft” (The new economy). He described it as a private-sector economy with a 
community will.
10 His concern was more productivity and less waste of every kind, which is 
the main objective of management control. “Today every loss, every waste is a matter of the 
community”.
11 In his book, he even gave a description of the cost savings known now as the 
experience curve. He argued with cost savings against laissez faire and propagated the central 
will of an organism instead of the multiple effects based on equilibrium by chance. Then he 
described the working of a system of associations that generates that central will together with 
a scientific plan of the division of labour. He distinguished those associations sharply from 
guilds that simply secure common individual interests. In his understanding, an association is 
a production community that connects all members in an organic way and is based on self-
government.  
 
The montan union (or association) founded after the war and the Provisional Economical 
Counsil founded in 1920 can be regarded as first applications of this ideas.The Provisional 
Economical Counsil had 326 members from all economic branches (including trade and 
consumers). The bosses of large corporations were among them (Siemens, Bosch, Stinnes, 
Rathenau, Borsig, Duisberg and others).
12 Another important association was the committee 
for economical efficiency founded in 1921 with C.F.Siemens as first chairperson.
13 The 
committee was influenced by scientific management in general and Hoover’s report “Waste in 
                                                           
7   Citation after Barkai (1988, 75), translation by Schwarz. 
8   F.e. Roscher (1880, 24, 113), Schmoller (1920, 5). 
9   Rathenau (1921, 75) uses the term „war socialism“ for their concept and it certainly influenced Lenin’s „war 
communism“.  
10   Rathenau (1921, 27). 
11   Rathenau (1921, 40). 
12   See Nussbaum (1978, 76 ff.). 
13   See Nussbaum (1978, 173 ff.). 10 
industry“ especially. The intention was to make up ground against the US corporations by 
introducing methods of rationalization into industry. Siemens declared in 1925 that the 




Later on Sombart’s (1934, 231) concept subsumed the associations under the will of the state. 
His concept was a basis for the fascist economic order.
15 Instead of 1600 assocations in the 
industry, which worked together based on voluntary agreements the economy was structured 
in 827 groups.
16 Important entrepreneurs and managers were the leaders of the groups. The 
minister of economics appointed them and they worked on a voluntary basis. Membership 
was forced and the control based on the leader principle.  
 
The idea of corporatism was also widespread in France, like more generally in Europe. 
However, if it largely influenced the work of pioneers of management in France like Detoeuf 
or Rimailho
17, it did not lead to an organization in which the State was to play the first part. It 
is the model of organization grounded on professional branches, in fact largely inherited from 
the history and promoted by the social Catholicism, which these polytechnicians supported. 
Management accounting was a major stake in this construction, as the action of Rimalho at 
CEGOS shows it. The goal was, through the construction of a uniform cost accounting system 
(method of the homogeneous sections), to prove the capacity of a professional branch in 
founding what one would name today (in a reminiscence of Taylor) "good practices" (or “best 
practices”) and to allocate the resources as well as possible, closing the less performing firms. 
Rimailho used the term 'homogeneous section' for a team (or a department, or a shop etc.) in 
which each member may have his own task to perform. That task may differ from the other 
members's tasks, but in the team, each order is processed through the elementary tasks of each 
member. In such an organization, providing that each specialized task is done the same way  
 
                                                           
14   See Nussbaum (1978, 176). 
15  Strasser, one of the fascists active in the conceptualization of the economic order under nationalsocialism, 
mentioned Schmoller, Rathenau and Sombart as forerunners of fascist ideas, see Barkai (1988, 101). 
16   See Zumpe (1980, 133). 
17 See Rimailho (1936) and Bouquin (1995a, 1995b, 1997a). 11 
by the worker in charge of it, the elementary spécilized tasks of the members constitute a 
sequence remaining the same whatever order is processed by the team. Therefore, the 
resources consumed by the team are homogeneous: they are in given proportions whatever 
order is considered. They are a whole and there is no need to consider and allocate them one 
by one. These resources are proportional to a driver to identify. In addition, they may be 
treated as a whole. 
18   
 
Rimailho proposed a market economy controlled by "the chief of the profession”. He was a 
typical heir of the social catholic movements of the XIXe century. It seems that the alliance of 
corporatism and Taylorism was, in France, more discrete and related more to the technique 
than in Germany. It is through a commission of the employers' organization (the General 
Confederation of the French Production, CGPF), called CEGOS, that Rimailho, Detoeuf, 
Coutrot, Milhaud and others, engineers from polytechnique, using accounting and shop 
management as tools, gained influence. However, this did not allow Detoeuf, founder of 
Alsthom, to become president of French employers. One knows that these active characters 
intervened in 1936 near the Popular Government of France so that the nationalizations were 
limited. Nevertheless, it was only with the Vichy government that the model of corporate 
governance inherited from the corporatist movement could be born for one moment. 
 
All that is not anecdotic. The connection with the calculation of the full cost was reinforced at 
that time, because the full cost was useful to judge competitiveness of firms. It is less known, 
moreover, that the United States themselves undertake, under the Roosevelt administration, 
with the NRA and NIRA codes, an evolution which tried to take the same way: a uniform 
system of calculation of costs was recommended, hundreds of codes were written, a lot of 
works were published for some branches, before the project was given up
19. By the way, this 
movement seems to have discredited the full cost and promoted the advent of direct costing 
(Harris, 1936) which was defended as the best method of income calculation. The debate 
started under Roosevelt, and was taken again lengthily after the war and until the middle of 
the Sixties. 
 
                                                           
18   A similar system of benchmarking was introduced in Germany. 
19  In Germany, a uniform system of cost accounting was introduced also. Besides full costs, it implemented 
imputed costs. 12 
After World War II the corporative system was dismantled but some elements of the 
corporate tradition continued, in France as well as in Germany. The first is the strong 
influence of the different associations. As a second, we mention the strong connections 
between firms and between them and banks in terms of cross ownerships. This has 
consequences for the governance structure. In some important cases, the banks were and are 
the major shareholder of firms. Their control became visible in times of probable bankruptcy 
of a firm. When the famous Metallgesellschaft was near bankruptcy, the major banks decided 
who should be the new CEO to reorganize the corporation. When the Dresdener Bank was 
near bankruptcy the insurance company Allianz as the major shareholder took over the bank. 
Cross ownerships are usually expressed in the composition of the board of companies. At 
least one banker is member on the board of large German corporations. All these bank 
members on the boards form a network of power. It is the dominating factor for Management 
Control in German firms. Albach et al. (1993) measured the centrality of 250 important 
German managers in this network. Twenty-seven managers had a centrality over 50 and 
sixteen of them were representatives of banks. However, not only shareholder interests are 
expressed on the board of German firms. The employees as major stakeholders have 
representatives on the board. This worker participation on the board is also a distinctive 
feature of corporate governance  in German firms. Moreover, the board serves as an 
information channel connecting the control decisions in different firms. One can interprete 
these features as a modern form of the traditional principle of association even if the words 
“network” or “connections” hide the essence.  
 
As third element of the German tradition the concept that a firm is a juristic person continued. 
This concept is different from the Anglo-Saxon understanding that a firm is the private 
property of somebody (the shareholders et cetera). A remarkable example is the lawsuit 
against the CEO of the Mannesmann group and three members of its board:  the chairperson 
and former CEO, the CEO of Deutsche Bank and the former chairperson of the metalworkers’ 
trade union. The public prosecuters accused them of embezzlement and unfaithfulness against 
the Mannesmann group by Vodafone because they decided that the CEO and the chairperson 
would receive millions of Euro in connection with the unfriendly takeover of Mannesmann by 
Vodafone. Despite the enormous growth of shareholder, value in this process the prosecuters 
and the German media feeled that the firm as a juristic person was harmed.  13 
It is clear that the German and French systems of corporate governance differed a long time, 
and still differ, from the North-American system. The German solution, it is well known, is 
concerned also with the stakeholders.The banking system seems able to regulate, at least 
partly, the usual conflict, very traditional in management control, between criteria of short and 
long term. Some authors underline the precariousness of the functions of the German 
presidents of company and their tendency to manage finally only for the shareholder
20. The 
model of stakeholder participation would be often purely theoretical, decisions would already 
be agreed upon before they come to the discussion in the councils. It could be even worse: it 
would give the opportunity to hide the essential under an organized flood of data. What use of 
management control data the German, French American boards of directors are doing? How 
they approach the decisions when the results on short and long-term enter into conflict? 
Which repercussions the German stakeholder’s model has on management? These questions 
are open to further research. 
 
IV. Management Control as a representation for the managers 
 
Management Control signals the missions devoted to managers whom it contributes to 
socialise.The managers of responsibility centers are induced to regard themself as 
autonomous, accountable persons in charge for their results, generally measured by financial 
metrics (sales, ROI for profit centers). Most of the time they enforce the strategy through 
annual action plans and budgets, but sometimes they propose strategies to the top 
management. 
 
Instruments designed to help decision-making and monitoring reinforce Management Control. 
Management accounting of the thirties describes the enterprise through the homogeneous 
section, whereas ABC sees it through the lens of its processes. These acounting tools can 
serve various goals, and they are largely influenced by the economic and social context. 
 
Below the level of influence by the corporate tradition, American control methods had a very 
strong influence on Management Control in Germany. Already during the period of scientific 
management, German authors were well aware that America had a comparative advantage in 
                                                           
20   See Bloch and Groth (1998). 14 
the development of management methods. Grull (1914, 9ff) saw the following reasons: 
accumulation of large capital which allowed for the large firm, complete economic freedom, 
high wages, strong trade unions which demanded shorter working time. Therefore, the firms 
were under pressure to plan more exactly in order to remove all causes for losses of time. 
After World War I the committee for economicalness adapted American methods to the needs 
of german firms. In 1930, Alford’s “Management Handbook” was edited in Germany. The 
German foreword appreciated that, in a scientific sense, the American economy was more 
highly developed than the German. One important reason was seen in the fact that American 




American literature and practice strongly influenced budgeting and ratio analysis. Because of 
the rationing during World War I the firms were already familiar with some planning or 
budgeting methods. The German Encyclopaedia of Business economics (1926) had an 
entrance “Budgetary Control”
22. The interest in American ratio analysis started out of the 
problems of German banks caused by the hyperinflation after World War I. These ratios were 
essentially key performance measures the banks used to assess the credit worthiness of firms 
or measures to assess the financial health of banks. The focus of interest moved gradually 
over to the application of key performance measures within the firms.
23 
The”Rationalisierungskuratorium der deutschen Wirtschaft” (RKW) organised the 
introduction of foreign management control methods in the firms. As a result, a number of 
books on “Betriebsvergleich” (comparison of firms, in today’s words benchmarking) 
appeared.
24 During that time up to the sixties performance measurement was discussed as a 
part of accounting under the name “enterprise statistics” (betriebswirtschaftliche Statistik).
25 
                                                           
21   SeeFrölich (1930, IX). 
22   Schmaltz (1926, 242). 
23   Schenk (1939). 
24   E.g. Schnettler (1933). 
25   See Kosiol (1932, 81-90), Bussmann (1963). 15 
After the fascists took over power, they introduced in 1936 a 5-year-plan. Afterwards the 
prices were fixed based on mark-up costs. The firms were under pressure to compare costs 
with each other. Under this pressure, the firms introduced “kalkulatorische Kosten” (imputed 
costs). To the usual costs (based on cash flows) imputed cost amounts for expected interest, 
risk, depreciation, and entrepreneur services were added. This approach continued in German 
firms up to the end of the 20
th century. Now some academics are arguing against this practice 
and some firms like Siemens abandon are going to abandon it. 
 
In France, as shown, the technocratic ideology helped develop costing methods and the 
“tableau de bord” concept. Both were intended to be tools for a more rational management, 
able to command and direct if the right information is provided. The aim was not to delegate 
or to transmit the strategic message as the "balanced scorecard” proposes it, a tool that is often 
(wrongly) compared with the “tableau de bord” (dashboard). The engineers, often 
polytechnicians, who developed these tools, intended to improve the knowledge of managers 
the cognitive capacities of whose were supposed to be very large! This is far from the 
American tradition of Sloan, which uses accountancy to delegate and to be informed by 
analyses of deviations. The important interest of the French engineers is the "full cost", i.e. the 
complete cost of a product or a service. The debate on direct costing will pass for this reason 
far from the concerns of the French managers, who are persuaded of the archaism of the 
accounting techniques, and who believe that the “tableau de bord” (dashboard) with its 
selective data can replace accounting in the process of steering. 
 
Management accounting, indeed, may be twofold. It can be used to identify the cost of a 
product, an activity, a process. It can also be used in a well-known cybernetic process, by 
which the standards are compared with the real data and the deviations are identified and 
decomposed. The French tradition clearly chose the first way, whereas the North American 
approach was directed definitely more towards the second. It is perhaps also because 
Europeans tended to calculate the prices starting from the costs, whereas the Americans start 
more readily from the principle according to which the prices result from the market. How to 
allocate the indirect costs is the major problem of Rimailho when he deals with management 
accounting. This problem led him to build an accounting technique very similar to Acivity 16 
Based Costing (ABC). The method of the homogeneous sections diffused after the war by the 
French charts of accounts is a weaker version.  
 
The investigations show that in Germany, as in France, the tools tend to be standardized. The 
traditional techniques are well established, in particular those of management accounting.  
Thus, in Germany, an investigation based on 320 answers of companies (Amshoff, 1993, 325) 
found that the most used techniques were, in the order: 1. Budgeting, 2. Cost accounting 3. 
Ratio Analysis and Systems of Performance Measures 4. Cost-benefit analyses 5. Techniques 
of the capital budgeting 6. Break eaven analysis, 7. ABC.  
Other methods are less used: SWOT analysis, value analysis, input-output analysis, scoring 
techniques. 
Since this investigation, the ranking did not change appreciably. Two years later, more than 
60% of a sample of 76 German companies ranked the methods, which they used, in this order: 




During the 90s, in Germany and in France, four new methods were successful: 
-  ABC, of which a version called “Prozesskostenrechnung” is known in Germany, 
- Target  costing, 
- Balanced  Scorecard, 
- Value  management
27. 
 
The convergence of the tools should not lead to suppose that they play the same roles nor that 
they are used in the same way everywhere.
28 Every firm can plan, but planning can play 
different roles, as this seems to be the case in Germany and in the USA
29. A qualitative study 
by Ahrens (1996), comparing English and German breweries, shows that, in the two 
countries, the concept of responsibility, or, more exactly, of accountability, is perceived very 
differently. For the British, the accounting representation of the performance remains a basic 
 
                                                           
26   See Stoffel (1995, 159). 
27   See Freidank and Mayer (2003, 229-329), Horváth (1996) and the German journals on management control. 
28   See Roberts and Scapens (1993). 
29   See Kreder and Zeler (1988). 17 
reference frame, even if the conscience of its limits is present. Quite different the German 
companies are accustomed to use financial and non-financial indicators. The technical 
processes draw more the attention than their financial image. The manners of treating the risk, 
to integrate it in the decisions, appear also rather different. Obviously one cannot generalize; 
it is clear that there is neither only one style of management per country, nor a single 
cognitive style.
30 All existing work is exploratory. Nevertheless, one can make the assumption 
of some tendencies. At the bottom, for the Germans as for the French, the technical skill 
remains the source of legitimacy. As far as economic performance is concerned, they remain 
probably persuaded that this technical skill is the source of performance. The study by Ahrens 
of German breweries seems to suggest that the technicians see in the recent tools based on 
processes the means of transferring a part of their power to accountants. These tools help 
them with a better understanding of the technique. The Anglo-Saxons seem to believe that the 
reduction of the costs depends on solutions, which the controllers must identify as a core of 
their own competencies. The French as the Germans think that, if such were to be the case, 
the technicians would hardly have legitimacy any more.  To confine Management Control to 
the image of reduction of the costs is then the worst of strategies for a controller. In the 
German breweries investigated by Ahrens (1996) the controller had hardly legitimacy to 
determine the plan and the objectives, his task was the production of data.  
 
The place of the controller is far from being taken for granted in such cultures. This holds 
even more if the controller is a mere accountant unable to exceed accounting logic to 
integrate, for example, that of marketing. One knows in which ghetto the accounting 
education was held a long time in France - but not in Germany. One understands also the 
strategy of many French companies, consisting in recruiting controllers among operationals. 
After 3 to 5 years spent in the management control function, they go back to operational 
responsibilities. 
                                                           
30   See Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (1993). 18 
V. Towards the  professionalisation of the management control 
function in Germany and France 
 
After World War II Germany experienced a strong influence by the victorious Americans. 
Within the German firms and in the academic community a growing interest in American 
business experience developed. In the year 1952 the Committee on Rationalisation of the 
German Economy (Rationalisierungskuratorium der deutschen Wirtschaft”, RKW) issued the 
report “Management Accounting” of a study commission of the Anglo-American Council on 
productivity visiting the US. 
31 This report described the controller and important methods 
like ratios and budgeting in much detail. At the same time, the report of a mission of CPA 
sent in the USA was published in France
32. Since the fifties publications about internal control 
and the tasks of the controller have grown.
33 They described him as leading director for 
finance and administration with tasks in accounting, planning, and statistics, forecasting and 
reporting.
34 The word “controlling” appeared as early as 1956, and its use was analogous to 
accounting.
35 The end of this discovery period of the controller in Germany is marked by two 
events: the foundation of the “Controller Akademie“ by Deyhle in the year 1971 and the 
working-group for controlling (“AWW Köln 1971”) in 1971 by Mayer. The equivalent 
association of French controllers was founded 1969. The results of these activities are the 
controller association (founded in 1975) and two journals: “Controller-Magazin” (founded in 
1976) and “Controller Berater” (founded in 1983).  
 
The next twenty years saw a growing number of university professors’ teaching management 
control, in France as in Germany. The field got the name “controlling” in Germany, 
“Accounting and control” in France. It is true that after the heroic period of the dashboard 
(“tableau de bord”), which tended to separate management control from accounting, the 
French rediscovered the virtues of accounting and the safety of its close link with 
management control metrics. It is ironic to note that the Anglo-Saxons, who built on the 
                                                           
31   no single author (1952). 
32   no single author (1952). 
33  See Auffermann (1952), Ahearn (1954), Zastrow (1955), Pochmann (1956), Ronneberger (1956), Neubert 
(1959). 
34   See Ronneberger (1956). 
35   Ronneberger (1956, 28): "Accounting is the source of insight for "Controlling" in the widest sense." See also 
page 31. 19 
strong link between management control and accounting, make a reverse way, (re)discovering 
the role of the physical indicators.  
 
In Germany the first textbook on “Controlling” (Hahn, 1974) presented a combination of 
planning and control. As early as 1973, we find a treatise about “Controlling as a teaching 
subject” which oriented on a broad spectrum of disciplines: accounting as a minimum, 
financing, capital budgeting, information systems, management, methods for quantitative 
analysis (optimisation etc.), basics of organisation theory, social psychology.
36 Afterwards the 
vast majority of university professors used the word “controlling” synonymous with 
“controllership”. The identification of controlling with controllership is nowadays called the 
institutional view of controlling. It is true that the USA met an evolution of the same type. 
"Management control" indicated all the techniques a long time making it possible to organize 
and to optimize, to rationalize the work of the managers, and these techniques included what 
Anthony named "operational control".
37  
 
The description of the controller’s tasks was not new. Already Mellerowicz (1963, 273-274) 
and Aghte (1969) formulated the tasks of the controller based on the descriptions of the 
Controllers Institute of America or the American Financial Executives Institute (FEI). Similar 
guiding principles were formulated much later in Germany – namely in 1996. One important 
task was new: “Controllers design and take care for Management Control Systems”
38. In 
France identical work of the DFCG, member of the FEI, goes back to 1969 and was re-
examined in 1980. In 1989, the journal “Controlling” was founded in Germany. In the same 
year, controlling was integrated in departments of accounting within 12 universities and 34 
colleges of higher education.
39 Eight years later at least 27 departments were teaching the 
subject, 6 in Austria and 5 in Switzerland.
40  
                                                           
36   SeeHartmann (1973, 336). 
37   See Giglioni and Bedeian (1974); Anthony and Day (1952), Anthony (1965); Malcolm and Rowe (1960). 
38   See: www.controllerakademie.de. 
39   See Mayer (1990, 306). 
40   See Hahn (1997, 32). 20 
In France, management control and, with a less degree, accounting has been ignored by the 
universities for a long time. The first Masters in Management (MSG, Maîtrise des sciences de 
gestion) and in Accounting (MSTCF, Maîtrise des sciences comptables et financiers) date 
from the beginning of the Seventies. The German and French universities answered thus an 
increasing demand of companies. The controllers were anxious to organize their profession, to 
affirm and mark their place in the flow charts
41.In the two countries one finds the trace of it in 
the published job offers for controllers. Actually, in France as in Germany and elsewhere, the 
academic work is much more concerned with the rich and ambiguous concept of control 




Already a few years ago, the researchers realized that other ways of management existed than 
those of Japan and the Anglo-Saxon countries.
42 In corporate governance, the German and 
French approaches deviate from the North-American model. For as much, specificities of the 
two countries remain. There is a long time that the first modern studies, related to the 
organization of the companies
43 or, more largely, to the national cultures 
 44 pointed to 
important differences. It still seems that the Germans do prefer neither extreme individualism 
nor the elitism of the French.
45 Still one never really investigated what is the core in systems 
of management, control or governance and what is the source of their ambiguity: the concept 
of responsibility. It remains than common values seem to lead the companies of the two 
countries to an approach of MCS rather different from what it is in the Anglo-Saxon world, 
and seems to structure in a specific way also the roles and the relative influences of the 
technicians and the controllers. At the time when the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
governance meets the limits of the "shareholders" approach and of the absolute power of the 
financial indicators, one could only underline the relevance of thorough comparative studies. 
 
                                                           
41   On rappellera qu’en Grande Bretagne le CIMA date de 1919 comme la NACA américaine, aujourd’hui IMA. 
42   See Barsoux and Lawrence (1990, 1991). 
43  See Horovitz (1978 a,b,c, 1980). 
44  Gonzalez and McMillan (1961) is a rare reference at this time, which put the question of the nonuniversal 
character of the North-American approach of management. See also Hofstede (1980, 1991). 
45  See Stewart (1996); Gouttefarde (1996); Barsoux and Lorange (1990, 1991, 1997). 21 
In this paper, we provided some insights into historical factors that influenced the evolution of 
Management Control and Corporate Governance. As a conclusion, we propose further 
research into the path dependency of the interrelationsip between Corporate Governance and 
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